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This paper interprets for the fist time the phenomenon of the made in Italy as a collective 
belief. First, a conceptual framework is proposed for analysing the formation and evolution of 
collective beliefs, by characterizing precisely the way individuals are expected to behave in 
this respect. Then, we argue that different paths may end up provoking the emergence of a 
collective belief, and maintain that the made in Italy can be though of as the case of a 
collective belief about the inventive and creative Italian way of producing a specific set of 
goods. Afterwards, we point to the investment in public rituals as the way to actively foster 
this collective belief, and then interpret such process as an economic problem of providing a 
public good. We highlight the main collective action implications of such analysis, by 
modelling individuals’ behaviour in different settings. The analysis is focused on those 
characteristics that make the made in Italy a special public good, such as joint private 
benefits, asymmetries between agents, accession costs, and transaction costs. Finally, policy 
and institutional implications are explored, in terms of redistribution, proactive subsidization, 
and contract design. 
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Cambiando paese – si cambia fortuna. 
Meglio bruciare un paese – che perdere un’usanza. 





1. Introduction: the virtual brand of a country 
 
Giacomo Becattini has argued in several works [take for all: 1998, 2000a] that the 
globalization of markets and the rapid change of production technologies and 
consumption practices imply that competition does not take place on the basis of 
either the price of standardized goods, or the quality of differentiated products. 
Rather, competition is strong in the ability to incorporate the desires of the 
users/consumers in the conception, production and marketing of a product. In short, 
what counts in today’s global competition is the “meaning” of the goods, as perceived 
by consumers, that a firm manages to incorporate in its production. This meaning, in 
turn, does not come out from particular goods taken in themselves, but from the 
status that these goods have in the wider supply system; it is like, following Saussure, 
the meaning of any linguistic sign – which is essentially arbitrary and agreed upon – 
which is given by the position it has within the whole language. In the Italian case, 
the sectors producing durable goods, furniture, fashion and food of the Mediterranean 
diet, as well as the conventional mechanics, all shape an integrated supply system, 
known as made in Italy. The crucial point is that this system appears objectively 
without any foundations. It is «nothing more than an aggregate of heterogeneous 
sectors, whose common ground rests in the definition that identifies them: sectors 
that provide a permanent positive surplus of the balance of payments, i.e. the sector 
of stable specialization of the Italian economy, with respect to the rest of the world» 
[Rullani 2000, 160]. More exactly, it is in the sphere of subjective representations that 
the made in Italy turns out to be a symbol that – by synthesizing the style, the 
character, and the character and aesthetic feeling of a population – embodies the 
Italian «leadership in producing goods in the systems of fashion, furniture, hobby, and 
food» [Fortis 1998, 15]. Hence, according to Becattini, the made in Italy exists insofar 
as it incites the «collective belief» of the world.   3
It is mainly through the unifying power of this belief that separate components of 
the Italian supply system valorise each other: if the Ferrari wins the Chinese Grand 
Prix, or if the star of Hollywood dresses Valentino, the result is that the wine from 
Piedmont, the stuffed furniture from Puglia, the packaging machines from Bologna, 
also gains appeal and reputation. As in the case of advertising, according to the 
classical analysis of Roland Barthes [1957], the images of made in Italy refer to 
specific meanings that are translated, in order to indicate something which is different 
than their literal meaning. The view of the Italian soccer team that raises the World 
Cup in the Berlin stadium means, on the one hand that our players have won the most 
ambitious prize, but on the other may allude to the Italian team spirit, to the 
creativity of individual players, or to the ability of react to conspiracies and exclusions. 
The connection between that image and other Italian goods confer therefore the latter 
a new symbolic connotation, until with the course of time those goods alone evoke 
imaginary meanings. The selection of positive images changes once in a while, 
although is preferably taken from the reservoir of the most captivating symbols: 
family as the “true” community, the importance of a few friends in an extraneous and 
hostile world, the appreciation of undisturbed power and exhibited beauty, the envy 
for luck and prosperity, the customary habits and local landscapes.
1 Just because it 
stimulates a coherent set of images that outstrip generations and boundaries, the 
made in Italy acts as a single virtual brand, or symbolic capital, that designates our 
country as a constrained monopolist supplying a series of goods that would be 
distinctive.
2 
Becattini’s analysis implies, among others, an element that should be immediately 
underscored. It suggests that, in the present-day globalization, the trends of world 
demand coagulate, not much around anonym firms within framed sector industries, 
but rather towards the specificities with which millions of wealthy and better-off 
consumers identify and distinguish the goods from this or that territory (continents, 
nations, districts). It follows that the competitive advantage of, say, Florence, 
Tuscany, or Italy, depends to a large extent by the strength and endurance of their 
successful image as locations of production, but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
as peculiar “sites of meaning”. It is therefore crucial to analyse in depth a 
                                           
1  This characterization of the Italian national identity may be compared to that of the historian Paul 
Ginsborg [1994, 8]: « Catholicism, love for family, artistic creativity, generosity, passion for soccer, 
clientele attitude, outmoded political and cultural elite, joy of living, lack of identification with the State». 
2 Together with the sectors of made in Italy, it is tourism the real basis of our economic growth [Becattini 
1998, 129]. Needless to say, the prosperity of the tourism sector is also linked to the positive strength of 
made in Italy in the world’s collective belief.   4
phenomenon traditionally outside the scope of the economic science: how human 
societies represent their socio-economic experiences to themselves and to the others. 
How do these symbolic images work? How are they built? How do they evolve or are 
changed? Of course, we do not have the ambition to articulate in a few pages a 
comprehensive answer. Our aim is showing the possibility to give a theoretical 
explanation to those facts. In this direction, we must use the insights from other 
disciplines, relying on an analytical framework that economists use to deal with. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a precise 
characterization of what we intend for a collective belief is provided. Section 3 depicts 
two different paths for the formation of a collective belief, focusing of the special case 
raised by the made in Italy. The transformation process of symbols into stereotypes is 
explored in section 4, where investments in public rituals are singled out as the means 
to fostering the collective beliefs. Section 5 is devoted to sketching the basic analytical 
model for analysing the economic problems surrounding the provision of the made in 
Italy, where section 6 presents some extensions required to adapt the model to the 
specificities of the case, and advances some policy and institutional implications. 
Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
 
 
2. The collective belief 
 
Dennett [1991, 332] reports that the British economist John Maynard Keynes had 
once been asked if he used to think in images or words. He replied that his thoughts 
were in thoughts. He was right in resisting the temptation to believe that we think 
through words or images, since the “mental images” are not exactly as pictures or 
photos in the head, and thinking “verbally” is not exactly as speaking to oneself. The 
human mind, reminds wisely Keynes, is not like a computer. The though is not always 
an inferential process, since, as noted by Gerald Edelman [1992, 35], «animals and 
humans partition the objects and events into categories, in a way that has nothing in 
common with logic or calculus». Above all, reasoning and language seem unconnected 
to the cognitive processes of the imagination. Any image we produce has not a 
propositional nature, as it would only describe, like a picture, what it represents. 
Imagination is an attribute of the human thought that has a pre-logical, pre-linguistic 
nature, often lacking intentionality (that is to say, it does not always point to a   5
specific object).
3 The mental images have a figurative character, not synthesisable in 
more abstract codes of representation, and so they are called “symbols”. According to 
Geertz [1973, 93-94], symbols are not simple reflections, instruments or counter-
values of our biological, psychological and social experience: they are prerequisites of 
such experience. For our purposes, we can observe that a symbol is a form that 
constitutes a cognitive condition of the possibility of human thought, and that a 
collective belief is the set of symbols within which a particular society, at any given 
time, thinks at itself and at the world. 
We partially follow the analysis of the eminent anthropologist Carlo Tullio-Altan 
[1992, 1998], as regards the process of formation of a collective belief. Tragic events, 
natural disasters or harsh conflicts are often destabilizing experiences for a human 
collective. The horizon of sense must be reshaped. The first step is taking out of the 
crisis, by simulating alternative scenarios: this implies getting out of history, i.e. 
leaving apart for a moment the actual spatial-temporal sequence of episodes.
4 The 
following step is codifying through the culture the alternative scenario. This scenario is 
“put on stage” and passed on from place to place, from one generation to the other, 
by means of public rituals (ceremonies, tales, art works, but also daily routines), in 
order to produce, disseminate and strengthen a stable and integrated hermeneutical 
course. The process works insofar as the group members identify themselves in the 
simulated scenario, as much as behave according to the horizon of sense that the 
scenario suggests. When this process is complete, a new collective belief is set up. 
According to Tullio-Altan, the formation of a collective belief also accomplishes 
cognitive tasks: the group reconsiders its condition, interprets it within different 
contexts, takes decisions and undertakes behaviours previously not admitted. But the 
“imaginative knowledge” should be distinguished from the knowledge through the 
ideas, which is the way to represent “something” specific.
5 In the cognitive process of 
ideas, the individual proceeds towards the object, in order to understand it better: this 
implies that the individual undertakes a critical separation, at the same time as he 
keeps an autonomous intentionality and awareness. On the contrary, by abiding to a 
collective belief, the individual associates himself and the object to the symbol: he 
sticks to images-values in which the distinctions between “me and you”, “me and 
                                           
3 This is consistent with the position of many economists, such as Marshall and Schumpeter, as reported 
in Loasby [2001, 11]. 
4 The original notion is due to Ernesto de Martino. We have preferred to directly account for the synthesis 
of Tullio-Altan, since we believe it puts the contribution of de Martino in a wider perspective. 
5  Tullio-Altan actually refers to “concepts”, not “ideas”. Concepts are ideas with a logical-linguistic 
structure. Hence, for our purposes, pointing to ideas is more appropriate.   6
them”, or “me and it”, have not yet been introduced.
6 Here, the individual acts on the 
conditions of sense of such distinctions. Therefore, while the knowledge through the 
ideas is a transaction between individual and individual, or between individual and 
object, the imaginative knowledge is an identification of the individual in the symbolic 
representation and, in this way, in other individuals and other objects. But if, in the 
symbolic experience, a single individuality is not yet separated from that of the 
others, this means that the symbolic experiences arise as directly inter-subjective. For 
instance, if in a private prayer the “cross” represents today a symbol of resurrection 
of the Spirit, this happens since that cross previously constitutes the symbol of a 
collective religious practice. The private and individualistic dimension of the 
elaboration of symbols exists insofar as it is connected to the dimension of the group: 
the belief is either collective, or it is not at all.
7 We will se below that this thesis has 
important implications in term of economic analysis of the phenomenon. 
 
 
3. Two paths for building up a collective identity 
 
It is again Tullio-Altan that in recent years has elaborated a model of formation of 
the ethnic identity of a human collective. Summing up, a collective identity «arises 
from a combination of factual elements, transfigured in symbolic values, which in a 
long term process end up constituting the content of self-consciousness of a 
population and its raison d’être as such [..] Those aggregating values are represented 
by: the memory of the glorious events that have paved the way of its unification and 
characterization as historical subject, i.e. its epos; the set of collective norms and 
related institutions, i.e. its ethos; the common language, its logos; the original 
genealogic stock from which it descends or believes so, its genos; and the location 
where it lives, its topos. There are cultural and natural elements, transfigured in 
identification symbols» [Tullio-Altan 1995a, 118]. 
Though perfectly agreeing with the approach of Tullio-Altan to the collective belief, 
we partially dispute his model of ethnic identity. It is a theoretical framework able to 
                                           
6  According to Geertz [1973, 169], in a ritual, the world as experienced and the world as imaged, 
together merged through the action of a unique ensemble of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same 
world. 
7 We are maintaining that phenomena such as the myth, ethic, politics, religion and even – after Marx, 
Malinowski and Polanyi – economics, are fed by a belief that is directly collective (or it is not). In so 
doing, we do not wipe out the existence of private symbolic experiences, such as dreams. The point is 
that dreams arise from the individual’s mind since he is inserted in the symbolic production process of a 
collective. On this issue, see Rossi-Landi [1978].   7
account for numerous historical experiences, but inadequate when a collective identity 
arises from a series of events in which conflicts, contaminations and migrations 
prevail on stable and peaceful interactions. While the latter may allow mitigating and 
aligning the values of various sub-groups, in so generating at least some of the five 
aspects of the Altanian model, what happens when the events show mainly contrasts, 
fragmentations and diasporas? An answer may be obtained by looking at a country 
that, more than Italy, has gone through a historical path in which many populations 
have not become a single nation: the United States. Gleason [1980, 32] wrote that, in 
order to be an American, an individual was not asked to gave a specific ethnic, 
religious, linguistic or national background. It was enough to commit to a political 
ideology centred on abstract principles of freedom, equality, and republican 
organization. A country may be thus composed of various sub-groups – the melting 
pot as a mix of ethnic groups – that share citizenship: the political loyalty to the 
republic tends to replace the common culture. This occurs, following Walzer [1992, 
99], by means of a protracted political activity, in which men and women that hardly 
accept their differences, recognize nonetheless that they share a commitment, that of 
the political arena and the people involved therein. Even a crucial election is a unifying 
ritual, not only because it has a unique outcome, but also because it affirms the 
existence of the arena itself, of the public issue and the people’s sovereignty. Hence, 
strangely enough, the foundation of a country-not nation as the United States, where 
there is not a previously-shared civic culture, rests exactly in having in common … the 
differences and peculiarities, as maintained by Bernard Crick [1962] and Albert 
Hirschman [1994], among others. As Crick [1962, p.22] argues, we often think that 
politics only works insofar as a specific idea of “collective welfare” previously exists 
and is shared by all, a sort of “consensus” or, better, consensus juris. However, this 
collective welfare is in itself the result of a practical reconciliation of social groups’ 
interests; it is not an external and intangible “spiritual cement”, or a “collective will”, 
or an objective “public interest”. Different social groups stay together since they 
exercise politics, not because they agree on fundamental values or other similar 
concepts, too vague, too particularistic, or too sacred to exercise politics in their 
name. The moral consensus of a free State is not something inexplicably higher than 
politics: it is the civilizing activity of politics. 
While we have mentioned above the citizens’ political practices, similar 
considerations should be made as regards economic activities. It is in this perspective 
that, turning to our country, we should consider the behaviours that are symbolically   8
represented in the made in Italy. We can admit the plausibility of the most widespread 
image with which we are represented in the world: «as individuals – one may say – 
Italians are more than valuable even on a conflict site, where often emerge all those 
positive attributes related to that kind of individualism, accentuated perception of 
one’s own single personality, that are pointed to as the true “genius of the Italian 
ancestry”. In duels, in actions of individuals or small groups, in guerrilla much more 
than war, in those cases in which it is necessary to rely on the action or commitment 
of individuals or a few of them (and even better when spontaneous and not solicited 
from the top), Italian do extremely well and, sometimes, they have no rivals. On the 
contrary, when it comes to face big collective challenges that require strong 
apparatus, efficient structures, strong discipline, solid leadership and guide, then the 
positive becomes negative» [Galasso 2002, 198]. From this picture it does not 
automatically follow, as maintained by Tullio-Altan [1995a, 124], that the foundation 
of made in Italy is the hero «of a population rich in individual intelligences and 
extremely poor in social intelligence». In fact, the quality of the civil fabric and the 
perception of the collective welfare may sometimes come about more from 
unintentional result of groups’ rivalry, territorial fragmentations and different 
normative values, than from a deliberate and crystallized national social integration.
8 
Actually, in Italy «social solidarity takes mainly the form of broad territorial 
identifications […] Absent any mandatory and widely-shared experience of social 
solidarity based on a “imagined community” at the national level, this system of 
fragmented solidarities will be more useful than one that would depend from general 
identifications. Insofar as the latter are present and active, they will tend to have a 
parasitizing relationship with respect to the more dynamic, even if more incoherent, 
system based on local or sector relationships» [Absalom 1995, 297; cited in Becattini 
2000b, 136]. This point is recognized, malgré lui, by Tullio-Altan, when writes: «if 
there have been and there are any virtues in the Italian ethos that can be properly 
t a k e n  as  s y m b o l  o f  w h a t  i s  b e s t  i n  na t i o n a l  t r a d i t i o n ,  a n d  up o n  w h i c h i t  w o ul d  b e  
possible to build a historically-positive myth, those virtues, widely showed by the 
events of Italian unification, should be found in the productive creativity and geniality 
of both workers and enterprises that have brought in the world, with honour, the 
results of their active presence» [Tullio-Altan 1995b, 58]. Hence, the competitive and 
                                           
8  Of course, the use of “sometimes” is required, since there are circumstances in which the typical 
individualism of Italians violates so much the norms of collective cohabitation, that it provokes civil 
disintegration and decadence. What should be avoided is the petitio principii according to which the 
devaluation of the “wide” collective dimension must necessarily provoke social damages which are 
greater than the group’s benefits [Tullio-Altan 1999, 216].   9
even opportunistic behaviours of the dynamic agent of made in Italy, may generate 
not only exclusive affiliations and shabby interest towards the particulare, but rather 
an authentic collective ethos. 
 
 
4. From public rituals to ideas and stereotypes 
 
In short, in the light of the previous reasoning, the reconstruction of the Italian 
collective identity does not come about mainly with reference to common values and 
cultural foundations, but rather looking at local shared practices, including politics, but 
also, at least equally important, economic activities. Accordingly, it is necessary to 
point to the «rituals of unity», to remind Michael Walzer. Such rituals belong to the 
set of public rituals, through which the symbolic experience is communicated and 
shared. They are social events characterized by a quite invariant sequence of actions 
and dispositions [Rappaport 1999, 24]: they include civil and religious ceremonies, 
holidays celebrations and exchanges of gifts, shared productive contexts, habitual 
commercial negotiations, sportive and media events, pedagogical itineraries, political 
meetings, judicial processes and punishments of criminals, funerals, marriages and 
other rituals, up to the most elementary daily interactions, from the neighbourhood 
gossip to the use of the same newspaper seller or the same fountain [Chwe 2001]. 
But obviously, not all usual social routines are public rituals. They become so when 
they modify the attitude of the group towards some symbols. In order to stick to the 
phenomenon we are dealing with, what transforms a heterogeneous and arbitrary 
constellation of “social facts” in the collective belief of made in Italy is the way in 
which a group of men behaves in its respect. In turn, what transforms such attitude is 
a set of public rituals, defined therefore as the process through which the belief 
becomes collective even when, at first, common values are absent. 
But how can a recurrent social interaction become a ritual? A crucial requirement is 
abiding, as main communicative technique, to simulation.
9  Language,  although 
essential, is more prone to transmit ideas, or more exactly concepts (see footnote 5), 
rather than symbols. Think instead at the celebration of a religious ceremony or the 
preparation of a provocative theatre show. The user/ recipient gets as his own the 
emotions lived and expressed by the celebrant or the actor, in a sort of directed 
participation. The religious ceremonies and the theatre shows are idealtypical 
                                           
9 In this respect, Tullio-Altan [1992, 104 e sgg.] uses the expression “show technique”.   10
procedures – within a greater family of public rituals – that transmit symbolic 
messages by means of involving and simulating the mobilisation of individuals. Here, 
with the term “simulation” we mean the fictio, i.e. “something manufactured or 
modelled”, not something untrue, unrealistic or merely relegated in a “as if” scenario 
[Geertz 1973, 53]. The simulation is therefore a prediction of the behaviours that 
(perhaps, but not necessarily) we will have outside public rituals, like when a scientist 
discovers a chemical formulae by means of the artificial simplicity of laboratory 
experiments, in order to apply it possibly, even with several complications, in 
“authentic” contexts of social life. Hence, when in a social event we manage to 
simulate other possible social events, we confer to that event the power of the public 
ritual. While a few actors perform to the benefit of a wide audience, the latter might 
undergo a double cognitive experience: at the linguistic-conceptual level, the audience 
is seating in a theatre enjoying the representation of a literary text; at the symbolic 
level, the audience enjoys the images evoked by the show and, on an individual level, 
converts those images in horizons of meaning. This is also true for less formal 
contexts: housewives talking every day when buying groceries may also show the 
double level of cognitive experience, if they simulate other social scenarios, perhaps 
imagining other life and consumption styles. 
It seems reasonable to maintain that Italy is a country with high ritual density [for 
all: Isnenghi 1997a, 1997b]. In order to restrict the attention to intentional, or 
regularly planned, rituals, these encompass religious functions in those days devoted 
to recurrent familiar celebrations, soccer matches, patriotic ceremonies, popular 
festivals, official political speeches, meetings of associations and even reproduction of 
stereotypes on food, music, dialects or the thousands of bell towers. It is on this very 
broad ground of public rituals – separated on a geographical basis and different from 
each other according to the intensity of symbolic participation – that the distinction 
mentioned in section 2, between knowledge-through-symbols and knowledge-
through-ideas arises. While symbols are the “forms devoted to think”, ideas are the 
“forms of thinking”. Symbols are completely open and indefinite: a waving flag, or a 
mother who feeds, or a restricted area, can be part of countless horizons of sense, 
from regressive values to subversive planning. On the contrary, once public rituals 
have ensured the reproducibility of symbols within a specific human group, and those 
symbols are translated into ideas, at that time the group’s members, voluntarily or 
not, begin to think unambiguous contents. This implies that, in order to assert 
something, something else must necessarily be denied. Such contents, even if fuzzy   11
and with multiple meanings, express degrees of congruence and stability that were 
absent before. 
But the effects of public rituals are not confined to establishing a symbolic 
(collective) heritage, nor do they only convert such heritage into ideas (learned and 
re-elaborated on an individual scale). Public rituals serve another aim, especially 
important for our analysis: they translate symbols into stereotypes. Such stereotypes 
are pre-established frames, beliefs which are fixed independently of the interpretative 
context, normative expectations that tend to prevail over the phenomena that 
countervail them, prejudices that frame and orient the paths of ideas.
10 That fact that 
public rituals try to convert symbols into stereotypes, emerges from organized 
processes – and therefore, in economic parlance, from specific investments – that 
tend towards social purposes that we can precisely describe: Machiavelli remembers 











But stereotypes do not always prevail through a conscious planning, nor are they 
always totally at the service of particular interests groups. In fact, it can happen that 
a whole collective – though internally prone to conflicts – shares a set of stereotypes 
                                           
10 Stereotypes are appropriately evoked by a well-know joke: «“Do you know what is my idea of hell?” 
ask a woman to another. “What’s it?”, answer the other. “A place where Italians govern, English cook, 
and Swiss are the lovers!”» [cited in Moghaddam 1998, 242]. 
11 For a political analysys of these issues, see Murray Edelman [1971, 1976, 1988].   12
about itself and foreign collectives, since this contributes to weaken and sometimes to 
eliminate complexity and uncertainty, even when interactions with the other 
populations are absent. It should be added that stereotypes are effective in 
communicating redundant information: they reduce the burden of circulating 
information, by codifying it rigidly, and setting up a few unambiguous transmission 
channels [Burt 2001]. 
It is the sequence that from symbolic images goes to ideas or stereotypes that 
makes the made in Italy a “genuine” force of the society. When a symbolic image is 
translated into figures or sounds, it becomes an idea. Ideas, rather than symbols, can 
materialize, i.e. can become objects or actions. As regards objects: «figures can be 
designed or described with words (as happens for a theatre text), sounds can be 
recorded or written (as for a script), and so forth. The materialization of ideas 
produces changes: unknown objects appear, known objects change their appearance, 
practices transform» [Czarniawska - Joerges 1995, 221]. As regards actions: «it is the 
expectation of future actions that allows the meaning of things to appear, but this 
expectation is a symbolic event. Something is a “means” insofar as the expectation of 
future action exists, hence if the future action is “drinking” then the glass is a water 
container, but if the future action is “harming”, then the glass is a harmful object. 
Things as such are available for all conceivable purposes; the specific one, and 
therefore its characterization, depends on expectations of future actions, but these 
expectations are exactly the symbols, which therefore do not mean, but rather act, 
and their action is the attribution of meaning from which the use of that thing 
depends» [Galimberti 1999, 207].
12 Therefore, the paths from symbols to ideas, and 
from these to objects and actions, constitute the route along which a collective belief 
can show up. 
As regards made in Italy as the virtual brand of our country, this perspective is still 
not enough. Ideas express meanings, and who formulates, re-elaborate or grasp 
them, proceeds on an ambivalent and contestable land, in which both conditioning 
and autonomy are present. This individual focuses, as far as he can, his own peculiar 
strategies for converting symbolic images that are shared in horizons of meaning 
[Sassatelli, 2003]. Therefore, the propagation of a collective belief does not happen 
by means of spreading, as in the case of a disease’s germs, but rather through 
translation  [Czarniawska 2000]. Individuals not only catch symbols, nor do they 
                                           
12  In this passage, even if very insightful, Galimberti does not distinguish, as we are doing, between 
symbolic images and ideas. It is ideas, not symbols, that anticipate actions and, in the end, trigger them.   13
transmit them literally. Each symbol, like an idea, is used in order to confer sense and 
identity to everyone’s lines of conduct. Even in nearly imperceptible ways, every 
symbol-idea is interpreted by each individual, selected, enunciated again, connected 
to other symbol-ideas. In such a way, a symbol can be crafted into contexts that are 
different from those for which it has been created, in so modifying the meaning of 
actions. Within this perspective, a cognitive investment of resources and time devoted 
to design and strengthen made in Italy as virtual brand appears useless. Rather, it is 
up to the stereotypes the task of reducing, in this respect, the uncertainty. In what 
follows, we examine therefore the process of investment in stereotypes. 
 
 
5.   A model of investments in stereotypes 
 
In the present section we model the economics surrounding the organization of 
rituals, devoted to promote stereotypes on the collective belief about the existence of 
made in Italy. Although what follows will be necessarily oversimplified, compared to 
the rich mechanisms that govern the formation of a collective belief, as outlined 
before, we believe there is scope for drawing some important lessons for policy 
purposes. First of all, we need to define the economic nature of such collective belief. 
As mentioned, a belief exists since it impinges on a collective: either a large group of 
individuals recognizes a collective belief as such, or it is not effective at all. This 
means that the social benefit of fostering a collective belief is higher the largest the 
group that have access to it. At the same time, the utility that an individual derives 
from the existence of this collective belief does not subtract the possibility of another 
to derive benefits from the same aggregate amount. From these two conclusions it 
follows that the collective belief on the made in Italy is undoubtedly a public good. We 
further maintain that this special public good jointly brings about different kinds of 
benefits, of varying degree of publicness, to distinct classes of agents. This implies 
that individuals will not have the same incentives to contribute to providing such 
public good. 
As known, the general results of the pure public good problem is disappointing, 
since provision will be suboptimal (Samuelson, 1954), and redistribution will not alter 
the aggregate allocation of resources (Warr, 1983), giving rise to strategic interaction 
and collective action problems (Olson, 1965). From these problems, a conclusion 
originates, according to which independent, decentralized action is often insufficient to   14
achieve allocative efficiency. Agents will tend to free ride and will generally fail to 
adjust the benefits that their effort confers on the others. Some form of external 
support to collective action may be warranted, in particular whenever the associated 
social gains are greater then the corresponding transaction costs. On the contrary, the 
conjecture behind another public goods model, the joint production model outlined by 
Cornes and Sandler (1984a), is that individuals pursuing their private benefits from 
contributing to a good involuntarily produce also public benefits for the rest of the 
society. Under particular but reasonable circumstances, the existence of joint products 
attenuates the underprovision problem and impairs the neutrality property, in so 
lessening the severity of the prognosis about collective action problems. However, as 
we shall see, this may distort the choice of outputs, the specific public rituals aimed at 
producing stereotypes, devoted to foster the collective belief. 
To formalize the problem of providing stereotypes to foster a collective belief in the 
made in Italy, we utilize the modelling approach set out by Cornes and Sandler 
(1984a, 1985, 1996). In what follows, we mainly distinguish two classes of Italian 
agents: generic tax payers and firms. 
Take taxpayers first. Their representative utility is given by the following function: 
 
() () c c c , Q z , y U U Χ =  (1) 
 
where c = (1, .. , n) is the representative taxpayer; yc is a private good used as 
numeraire, whose price is set to zero; z(Q) is the not-rival and not-excludable benefits 
to Italian taxpayers, owed to the diffusion of a collective belief on made in Italy, for 
instance in terms of higher price for Italian goods, economic growth and employment, 
that is the aggregate amount of the public good; finally,  c Χ  is a vector of tastes or 
exogenous variables that may affect welfare, positively or negatively, by modifying 
the marginal benefit of the public good. One may think at those workers employed in 
Italian firms, who derive a direct benefit from more sales in terms of secure job, 
higher pay, etc.. 
Italian firms benefit in a very different way, compared to a representative 
taxpayer, from a collective belief on made in Italy. In particular, they may gain a 
commercial advantage over foreign competitors. Still, these benefits are purely-public, 
but do not exhaust the range of effects provided by a collective belief. Firms directly 
taking part to public rituals may also eventually gain a commercial advantage vis-à-
vis not-participating national rival firms. Moreover, those firms may be relatively less   15
concerned about the price or quality of their products, since consumers buy them on 
the basis of other considerations (essentially, their symbolic meaning). Hence, 
investing in fostering stereotypes has, for a particular firm, a double dividend: on the 
one hand, it gains share in foreign and national markets; on the other hand, it gets 
larger profits, since may impose higher prices or may reduce quality.
13  As  a 
consequence, besides the public benefits that may accrue from fostering a collective 
belief, Italian firms that finance public rituals derive benefits that are either 
excludable, partially or totally, or rival after a certain threshold, that is of private 
nature. The more a firm operates in a foreign market, the higher is this kind of 
benefits. Goods that provide such a mixture of benefits are known as joint products. 
The benefits accruing to Italian firms from this joint product may be grouped into 
various categories, according to the outputs provided. The degree of publicness is 
measured by the ratio of private benefits to total benefits. Purely-public benefits 
accrue to firms from contributing to the organization of major public events, such as 
the 2006 Olympic Winter Games in Turin, which have an indirect impact on the 
collective belief and are broadly relevant for the Italian products as a whole. Yet, if a 
firm supports directly that event and, as a consequence, is allowed to advertise during 
the games, it also gets a specific additional benefit, which is precluded to non-
contributors, thus excludable. Impure (rival) public benefits derive from a commercial 
campaign aimed at promoting a global view of Italy as a country offering a complete 
range of high-quality products. If this set of products admits only one illustration per 
each product category, being in such initiative means, for an Italian firm, representing 
the country’s archetypical supplier for that category. As a result, the contributor 
obtains rival benefits, since participation of one firm precludes another from having 
the same level of visibility. Finally, localized public benefits may be associated to 
campaigns targeted to specific territories, such as an Italian Region, which may foster 
the demand for the produce of local industrial districts. For analytical simplicity, in 
what follows we restrict the attention to the different publicness of two main outputs 
(rituals), organizing a public event and undertaking a commercial campaign, without 
differentiating further among private benefits. 
The utility function of a representative Italian firm can be thus formalized as 
follows: 
 
                                           
13 For example, Barilla sells more pasta abroad than all other rivals, though the products of some of them 
are recognized to be of better quality.   16
() ( ) () i i i i , Q , q , y U U Χ ϕ δ =  (2) 
 
where i = (1, .. , m) is the representative Italian firm; yi, its private good, can be 
though of as a substitute marketing activity carried out by each firm, without alluding 
to any collective belief;  () Q ϕ   is the aggregate amount of the purely-public benefits 
accruing to all Italian firms. Apart from the magnitude of these benefits, which clearly 
differ from those of consumers, the key aspect distinguishing equations (1) and (2) 
lies in the term  () i q δ , which denotes the part of benefits that accrue to each producer, 
as a function of its specific contribution, not of the aggregate contributions. Finally, 
the exogenous variables  i Χ  may include, in the case of firms, the effect of operating 
in highly competitive and globalized foreign markets, such as US and Japan, whereby 
a major effort is needed to gain a greater market share in a specific sub-sector, so 
that the marginal benefit of the collective belief is also higher then in other markets. 
To see why collective action problems in providing a joint-product public good may 
be less harsh than in the case of pure public goods, we first need to figure out why 
distinct agents have different incentives to finance a set of initiative aimed at fostering 
the collective belief in the made in Italy. As seen, it is through public rituals that the 
symbolic experiences aliment a collective belief. This investment is large relative to 
each consumer, and even a single firm may not afford it entirely. But the average cost 
per agent benefiting from this public good is low and the net social benefit can be 
substantial. If it is worth promoting a collective belief, then real resources have to be 
employed to organize public rituals. We may therefore think at public rituals, aimed at 
disseminating stereotypes, as the investment in the public good, that is to say the 
technology of its production. It follows that the contribution of each agent to 
organizing public rituals may be interpreted as the individual demand for the public 
good. 
We first analyse the incentives to provide a public good in the general case of 
purely-public benefits, which represents the Italian taxpayer’s expected behaviour, 
and then for the joint products, characterizing Italian firms. For the moment, suppose 
that the overall amount of the public good is given by the simple aggregation of 
individual contributions,  ∑ = =
n
c c q Q
1 , where qc is the subscription of a generic 
taxpayer c (his demand for the public good). This means that all agents are identical. 
We further define the budget constraint of consumer c as  c c c I pq y = + , where Ic 
represents the agent’s total endowment of real resource (income) and p is the price of   17
the public good, in term of opportunity cost of releasing resources from production of 
good y.
14 
Individual maximization of utility (1) subject to the budget constraint gives the 
following first-order conditions: 
 
() ( ) c c c
y , q




c MRS   is the marginal rate of substitution between y and q, or 
alternatively the marginal benefit provided by the public good,  c MB , which represents 
the agent c’s willingness to pay for it. Since for all consumers holds that 
∑ = = <
n
c S c c MB MB MB
1 , where MBS is the marginal social benefit, then the 
marginal benefit that an individual contribution confers on other agents is ignored in 
agent c’s selfish calculation, so that underprovision (easy riding) is predicted. Only 
individuals whose net benefits are positive will have an incentive to subscribe the 
public good. This leads to the first implication for collective action: there will be a 
disproportionate asymmetry in sharing the burden of provision. Since the aggregate 
cost of setting up the public rituals could be substantially high, though the average 
cost per consumer is low, the representative taxpayer will hardly be able to afford 
strictly positive investment. Perhaps, only a very rich individual may be induced to 
invest some resources in providing a collective belief, allowing the others to free ride. 
The second collective-action implication of interest herein is the ineffectiveness of 
public policy, whenever agents are perfectly identical. In order to show it, a further 
step is required. Denote with  c q Q Q
~
− ≡  the contribution of all consumers but the 
generic agent c and rewrite the budget constraint in the equivalent form 
c c c F Q
~
p I pQ y = + = + , where Fc is called “full income”. This allows making the 
following transformation of the utility function (1): 
 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) c c c c c c c c c , p Q z , F V , Q z , pQ Q
~




⎛ − + =  (4) 
 
                                           
14 If both goods are normal, the demand for the public good unambiguously raises with more income 
and/or lower price.   18
From equation (4) it is evident that the individual level of utility, and the resulting 
choice of q, cannot be determined without reference to Q
~
. We adopt the non-
cooperative Nash-Cournot assumption of independent adjustment behaviour, that is 
individual’s expectations concerning Q
~
  are exogenously determined. If agents are 
identical, this is equivalent to assuming that Q
~
 is always taken as given.
15 In such 
circumstances, the underlying strategic behaviour implies that a redistribution of 
resources will be neutral in terms of aggregate amount of the public good. Any 
variation in agents’ budget, such as a transfer from the individual c to the rest of the 
community, will be completely offset by a reduction in agent c’s willingness to pay for 





d dqc . 
This happens because, from equation (4), the only way to hold utility level 
constant following a lump-sum tax on income is to reduce the demand for the public 
good by the same amount, so that  c c dq dI − = − . Given that all individuals are 
identical, it will also hold that a subsidy will produce an increase in the demand of the 




~ = . Hence, an individual whose income has fallen 
experiences an increase in the others’ contribution, called spill-in. To leave its utility 
level unchanged, the individual that experiences such “real income effect” will reduce 
its demand for the public good. In fact, in determining equilibrium choices, individuals 
care about the sum  Q
~
I + , not about the two parameters separately. The marginal 
condition for individuals’ equilibrium is not affected, and the aggregate availability of 
the public good, Q, remains unchanged. 
Summing up, the aggregate amount of the public good is given by the sum of 
individual contributions that simultaneously satisfies equation (3) for all agents. By 
the implicit function theorem the generic demand for the public good, or reaction 
function in game theory parlance, can be written as: 
 
() c c c , p , F f q Χ =  (5) 
 
                                           
15  For a model with non-zero conjectural variations, which assumes relevance for the problem of the 
optimal size of a community, see Cornes and Sandler (1984b).   19
While these results hold for the class of agents broadly defined as taxpayers, 
Italian firms may have very different incentives to pay for public rituals that foster a 
collective belief in made in Italy. Recall from equation (2) that firms get both public 
benefits,  () Q ϕ , and private benefits  ( ) p q δ  from each unit of the public good. Suppose 





⎛ + = = Q
~
q Q Q i α α ϕ  and  ( ) p p q q β δ = . It follows that equation (2) can be 









⎛ + = i i i i i , Q
~
q , q , y U U Χ α β . Hence, each unit of the public good 
supplied by agent p yields α  units of the public benefit and β  units of the private 
benefit. In this case, the Nash equilibrium results when each agent simultaneously 
satisfies its first-order conditions: 
 










p MRS α   is the marginal willingness to pay for outputs yielding purely-
public benefits, and 
xy
p MRS β  is the marginal willingness to pay for outputs producing 
private benefits. In equation (6), the weighted sum of the two marginal valuations is 
equated to the relative price of organizing public rituals. On the contrary, Pareto 










⎛∑ = β α
1 . Hence, the first best is not 
achieved unless  0 = α  and  1 = β . This means that if the collective belief would not 
produce any public benefit to Italian firms, but only private ones, incentives would be 
the strongest. In this case, a club-like arrangement would achieve the first best 
allocation. Conversely, if  1 = α  and  0 = β , then the benefits accruing to Italian 
firms from investing in public rituals would be purely public. Hence incentives for 
underprovision would be similar to those of a generic taxpayer, with strong easy-
riding. 
The case in which both α  and β  are both strictly positive is a general model of 
public goods with different degree of publicness. It is of special interest for our 
purposes, since we are convinced that the collective belief in made in Italy may be 
fostered by means of various outputs, each producing a unique combination of public 
and private benefits for Italian firms. In fact, contributing to a major public event 
confers much more purely-public benefits then financing an advertising catalogue of   20
Italian exporting firms, which raises the utility of the single agents in a selective way, 
according to their decision to contribute or not. 
Three collective-action implications can be drawn from the joint product model. The 
first is that the marginal influence of community spill-ins on an agent’s own effort is 
far more complicated than the case of pure public goods. In particular, it can be 
positive or negative, depending on the consumption relationship of the jointly 
produced outputs. If an increase in the availability of the public benefits augments the 
desirability, or marginal valuation, of the private benefits, then the two outputs are 
said to be Hicksian complements in consumption. Otherwise, the two outputs are 
substitutes. In our opinion, the case we are dealing with is one in which public and 
private benefits are complements to each other. This follows from the fact that, the 
more is spread the collective belief in made in Italy, which is in turn a consequence of 
past and present actions aimed at achieving such result, the greatest is the private 
benefit that each firm gets from undertaking specific contributions to future initiatives. 
Hence, the purely-public spill-in accruing from the existence of a stronger collective 
belief in made in Italy may induce Italian firms to contribute more to organizing public 
rituals, so as to secure more private benefits, which can only come from their own 
spending. Thus, the model allows the possibility that a lager contribution of one agent 
would crowd in other contributions. In this manner, undersupply would be 
spontaneously curbed, while the generic taxpayer would be allowed to free ride 
completely. The effects of the spill-in can be modelled by recalling that the budget 
constraint can be rewritten as  i i i F Q
~
p I pQ y = + = + . The individual reaction 






⎛ = i i i , p , Q
~
, F f q Χ  (7) 
 
Compare equation (7) with equation (5): the presence of the additional term Q
~
 in 
the demand function is the (positive or negative) spill-in from community contribution 
on the demand of agent i for the private characteristics of the public good, which may 
reinforce or counteract the real income effect on aggregate provision. For public and 
private benefits which are strongly complements to each other, it has been shown 
that the underlying coordination game form has multiple Nash equilibria (Sandler, 
1992). For strong complements, it can hold that  0 > Q
~
d dqi , so that all players 
contribute. Hence, a joint-product scenario in which benefits are strongly   21
complements may eliminate defection as the dominant strategy: failure to contribute 
may yield a smaller payoff, since the related private benefit would not be achieved. 
However, it should be noticed that technical change and shifts in preferences can alter 
the share of excludable benefits. Hence, incentives to contribute must be ascertain in 
each case and in a dynamic fashion. 
The second implication of the joint product model is that redistribution is not 
anymore neutral. The presence of excludable outputs can limit substitutability derived 
from the contributions of others. Hence, insofar as individuals differ in their marginal 
valuations of the public and private benefits, their real income responses to 
redistribution will not cancel out among each other. In particular, a small tax on firms 
displaying higher ratios of private to total benefits would not produce a reduction of 
their contribution, since these firms would still be motivated in order to get private 
benefits. Tax-financed public benefits are unlikely to crowd out individuals’ 
contributions. However, it is by no means clear whether the effect of a redistribution 
policy would be beneficial or harmful to the aggregate supply of public benefits. This 
depends on the specific outputs employed to produce the public good. 
In fact, a third implication of this model is that agents may invest selectively in 
specific activities, according to their preferences and resources, as well as the 
technological and institutional environment, so as to produce different outputs yielding 
a particular mix of private and public benefits. The agents’ investment in the public 
good can be shaped so as to alter the combination of public and private 
characteristics. Suboptimality is envisaged for the aggregate provision of rituals 
producing purely-public benefits, such as major events, while for commercial 
campaigns, club-like arrangements may endogenously arise and eventually achieve 
the first best. This means that a protracted effort to foster the collective belief in 
made in Italy through a series of broad public rituals would be hardly achieved 
without the intervention of a central authority, while spontaneous coalitions of firms 
that, when required, jointly promote a commercial campaign are more likely to arise 
independently. Anecdotal evidence supports such conclusions. 
 
 
6. Confronting the reality: asymmetries, sunk costs, policy and institutions 
 
In the present section, we wish to further enrich the analysis of joint-product public 
goods, by exploring the implications of introducing specific hypothesis to the basic   22
model, which are more consistent with the reality. Since we consider the combination 
of public and private benefits, we mainly deal with the expected behaviour of firms. 
We focus on four three aspects: the way agents differ in terms of demand and supply 
of the public good; the nature of costs agents must incur to derive the benefits of the 
public good; the role of public policy in promoting individual contributions and 
overcoming major coordination failures; and the way institutional design could impact 
aggregate supply. 
Differences between agents entail many aspects: resource endowment, tastes, 
exogenous characteristics, and efficiency of supplying the public good. The issue of 
asymmetry in income has been dealt with in the previous section, when the 
exploitation hypothesis has been mentioned. In the joint product model, this result 
does not necessarily hold, since an agent with small income could nonetheless get a 
favourable proportion of private benefits, hence he may have high incentives to 
contribute. Tastes and exogenous parameters also shape contributions in a 
predictable way: a great preference for the public benefits and/or a situation that 
makes the public benefits more valuable to an agent will shift its reaction function in a 
way that is more conductive to positive contributions. 
The way agents’ contributions combine with each other to determine the aggregate 
amount of the public good, is called social composition function, or technology of 
public supply. This aspect deserves special attention. The technology of supply 
underlying the basic model presented in the previous section is additive, in such a way 
as the total amount of the public goof is  ∑ = =
m
i i q Q
1 . However, some firms, for 
instance those exporting in highly-competitive markets or those dealing with luxury 
products, may be more efficient than others in organizing public rituals, for instance 
because they have previous experience or a superior production process. In this case, 
the total amount of public good would be the weighted sum of the individuals’ 
contributions, that is  ∑ = =
m
i i iq w Q
1 , where wi is a parameter representing the 
marginal efficiency of the individual i’s contribution, relative to those of the others. 
Public goods that abide to a weighted sum production technology limit the degree of 
substitutability, and hence publicness, derived from the contribution of others. As a 
result, redistributing income in favour of the relatively more efficient agents has the 
desirable effect of increasing total provision, and in so doing, also aggregate social 
welfare, in so benefiting the entire society.   23
Another interesting aspect of asymmetry between agents arises when benefits 
accrue only at the local level, in particular to those agents that afford an initial 
accession cost of a sunk nature. Public goods producing such benefits are known in a 
recent strand of literature, as “specific” (Bellandi, 2003). Here, we attempt to sketch a 
conceptual framework for analysing the relationship between specific public goods, 
and joint products with different degree of publicness. First of all, the conditions upon 
which a public good is specific must be drawn. Call m the number of agents in a sub-
group of the society characterized by, say, a common specialization or localization, 
with m < n. Denote with k the sunk cost required to access the benefits of a public 
good. This public good, whose aggregate quantity is S, will be specific if the agents 
are linked to each other by a subjective nexus, i.e. share common subjective features, 
and at the same time satisfies the following conditions: 
 
() {} m ,.., j , k S U
e
j 1 0 ∈ ∀ >> −  
() j i , k S U
e
i ≠ ∀ ≤ − 0 
     ( 8 )  
 
Equations (8) say that, for the sub-group of m individuals, and for them only, the 
expected utility deriving from S being produced, net of initial sunk costs (but not of 
production costs), is greatly larger than zero. Once this condition is satisfied, the 
actual utility level of each individual, and thus the incentive problems in financing the 
public good, can be brought back to the analytical framework depicted in section 5 fro 
purely-public goods. The different incentives to provide a specific public good, 
compared to the general case of universal public goods, is that the community of 
potential contributors is smaller, and this implies in principle that the average 
contribution is higher, though not necessarily large at an aggregated level. 
A second step entails ascertaining the specificity of the benefits produced by a 
collective belief in the made in Italy. Above all, there is the professional specialization 
of the firms localized in an industrial district, which is the basis of the literature on 
specific public goods. The made in Italy related to the leather sector may be well 
associated to a specific leather district. Furthermore, some sunk investments can be 
specific to other firms that pursue a commercial strategy in which the made in Italy is 
a strong component. We refer to marketing studies, or specialized consultancies, that 
can be needed to fully exploit the private benefits of the investment in stereotypes. 
However, for specific public goods, there is a negative income effect deriving from 
the sunk costs that worsens the budget constraint, that is  j j j pq y k I + = − ; this   24
tends to reduce, ceteris paribus, the individual incentive to contribute. As a result, it is 
not possible to infer, a priori, the degree of sub-optimality in the production of a 
specific public good. What can be supposedly advanced is that specific public goods 
also produce many benefits which have a private nature for the sub-group of 
beneficiaries. 
On the basis of the co-production model, when private benefits are perceived by a 
small group, it is highly probable that the cooperative behaviour is predominant. It 
follows that there is a theoretical justification to supposing that the aggregate quantity 
of specific public goods that produce private benefits, can be close to the Pareto-
efficient level. In turn, such specific public goods may produce, besides private 
benefits to the sub-group of m subscribers that spend in sunk accession costs, also 
public benefits for the entire society of n individuals, though at a low degree. The 
utility of the j-th agent can thus be rewritten as follows: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) S G , q x , S F , y U U j j m j j =        ( 9 )  
 
where  () S Fm  and  () S G   are respectively the pure specific benefits and the pure 
universal benefits deriving from supplying S units of the public good. On the contrary, 
the  i-th agent, that do not pertain to the sub-group of specific beneficiaries, also 
perceive universal public benefits, hence his utility function will be: 
 
() () S G , y U U i i =           ( 1 0 )  
 
It is evident that only the j-th agents have incentives to supply the specific public 
good. When universal benefits are scarcely relevant, i.e. if  ( ) S G  i slow, the incentives 
of the i-th agents are nil. This framework has also the virtue to underlie the 
mechanism according to which universal public benefits may be produced through the 
initiative of a sub-group only of the society. 
The asymmetries between agents explored so far imply that coordination through 
public policy still remains germane to obtaining such aggregate amount of the public 
good. Unless a critical mass of contributors is achieved – whether stimulated by their 
resource endowment, preferences, private benefits, or public subsidies – large 
contributions will not materialize. This is the main foundation for public policy, which 
should be able to encourage both those agents who would derive private benefits from 
the public good but do not own sufficient resources to contribute, and those agents   25
whose income is enough but would not obtain sufficient private benefits. The former 
policy would try to reinforce the incentives of those who already have reasons to 
invest, while the latter would aim at expanding the group of contributors. Preference 
in redistribution should also be given to those agents whose production process is 
more efficient than the average contributor. Such measures are clearly Pareto-
improving with respect to the total amount of the public good. 
However, contrary to the common wisdom set out in the previous section, it is 
crucial in this respect to ascertain the specific composition of the group of 
contributors. Call ( λ − 1 ) the fraction of firms that derive enough private benefits 
from the joint product to consider it worthwhile to make sunk investment, and λ  the 
fraction of those that do not. Simultaneously, call ( ϕ − 1 ) the fraction of firms that 
have enough resource endowment to afford such investment, or have preferences 
that are conductive to contribute, and ϕ  again those that do not. In order to depict a 
clear picture of the problem, the two aspects must be jointly considered, since they 
influence each other. Figure 2 helps clarifying this point. It is by no means clear that a 
larger group of firms whose endowment is enough to cover all costs will automatically 
make greater contributions, since private incentives should be ascertained as well. 
 
 




If the firms who experiment an increase in income, due to, say, a subsidy, are 
nonetheless those which get few private benefits from the public good, then the 
resulting aggregate provision would be unaffected. It can also happen that the 
aggregate amount of public good will fall if, for instance, among the firms that are 
taxed there are those which have just sufficient resources to invest. In order to 
overcome this problem, a high degree of coordination is required. Hence, a public 
( ϕ − 1 ) ϕ
λ
Do not invest 
Invest 
( λ − 1 )  26
policy aimed at fostering individual incentives to invest in the made in Italy should be 
more proactive than a simple redistribution. Richer firms that get a large share of 
private benefits should be singled out for the purpose of taxing them, since they will 
preserve incentives to invest. On the contrary, subsidies should be directed towards 
inframarginal firms, i.e. those which would fall under the share of contributors 
( λ − 1 ), once they experiment an increase in income. Such group of firms must be 
also distinguished, before going ahead with subsidizing them. As a result, the concept 
of “selective incentives” should be enriched, so as to allow for detecting the peculiar 
circumstances of each firm. 
A final remark in this section should be made for what concerns institutional 
design. A formal agreement could be used by potential contributors as an institutional 
device devoted to govern their collective action. An agreement may, for example, 
implement a club-like arrangement, which augment the incentive to invest, although 
not necessarily up to the optimal amount. Such institution would be a contract 
establishing a governance regime among a subset of potential suppliers. Such 
contract may guarantee a minimal mandatory contribution from signing parties, 
whose amount is known ex-ante. Yet, the decision on contribution levels has to be 
distinguished from that of taking part to the agreement or not, in so enriching the 
scope for economic analysis. 
Murdoch et al. (2003) analyse this problem as a two-stage sequential game, in 
which the actual contribution is chosen by the agents after deciding whether or not to 
participate formally in an agreement. The decision on whether to sign or not an 
agreement, call it  {} 0 1, Di = , with 1 denoting participation, is apt to include variables 
that are not part of the contribution decision; nonetheless, since  i D  is contingent on 
the second-stage determinants, given the assumption of subgame perfect equilibrium, 
the latter variables are part of both decisions. In symbols, firm i’s potential 
participation to the agreements depends its expected utility: 
 
() () • i i i q , U Γ  (11) 
 
where  i Γ  is a vector of first stage determinants of utility level, which are specific to 
each firm, and  () • i q  is the individual demand for the public good in the second stage, 
which may be equation (5) or equation (7), depending on the ratio of private to total 
benefits. Agents’ decision to participate or not to the agreement in taken on the basis   27
of a comparison between the expected utility from signing, 
P
i U , and that of not 
signing, 
N
i U . Agents will sign the agreement if the difference between the utility 




i U U . If setting up the agreement involves 
positive sunk costs, either because the public good is specific or because transaction 
costs are present (for instance to gather relevant information, monitor the behaviour 
of co-signers, enforce the agreed-upon contribution levels) this difference should be 
strictly greater than zero. Therefore, the probability that  1 = i D , may be written as: 
 




i U U ) =  () ( ) • i i q , F Γ          (12) 
 
As indicated in (9), the probability to sign is dependent on the determinants of 
utility difference, hence on both first-stage and second-stage variables. First-stage 
determinants,  i Γ , can include the desire of a firm to penetrate a foreign market, or 
the fact that a firm had directed its past marketing efforts to giving an image of itself 
which is consistent to the collective belief in made in Italy. These determinants may 
well provide different individual incentives to adhere or not to a formal agreement. 
Yet, the most interesting aspects of this extension of the basic model lie in the 
comparative statics resulting from a modification of second-stage variables. In fact, 
these variables may have quite a different qualitative impact on Di, than it has on the 
contribution decision, since may operate on 
P
i U  and 
N
i U  in a different way. Second-
stage variable that worsen the prognosis for collective action serve to augment the 
perceived net gains of a formal agreement. 
Other things held constant, an increase in Q
~
, the contribution of the others, 
implies less overall contribution in the absence of an agreement. Hence, a rise in 
spillovers is anticipated to augment the gains of signing for many potential 
participants, since constraining oneself contribution to a high level is more worthwhile 
when others are also constrained to do so. Conversely, an increase in β , the 
proportion of private to total benefits, is anticipated to increase agent’s utility derived 
from its own contribution, since less of a welfare gain materializes from joining an 
agreement, so that there are incentives to act alone. An increase in the price of the 
public good results in smaller individual contributions in the absence of an agreement, 
meaning that a greater potential gain can come from signing and committing to a 
specific contribution level. A remarkable result is that greater income levels lead to   28
larger contribution even without an agreement, thus limiting the potential gains from 
committing formally. However, a larger resource endowment allows a firm to make 
those sunk investments (marketing studies, consultancies) that can be needed to fully 
exploit the private benefits of the investment in stereotypes. Hence, public decision 
makers should be aware of the potential effects of redistribution, when deciding on 
how to support the public good provision. Finally, the influence of larger mandated 
contributions is more difficult to anticipate and must be determined empirically. Gains 
follow from making other participants contributing by more, while losses come from 
larger contributions that the individual firm has to achieve. 
The decision to take part to an agreement could be further enriched by examining 
the effects of an imperfect enforcement mechanism (Sandler and Sargent, 1995). The 
difficulty of imposing to the others a targeted contribution level implies that, even with 
an agreement, there is uncertainty about the extent of aggregate provision. Suppose 
that a minimal threshold of contributors is required before the public good displays its 
benefits. Hence, if acting alone is more beneficial than cooperating when the minimal 
threshold is not attained or maintained, incentives exist for potential participants not 
to sign the agreement. This is a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria, in 
which the larger the size of contributors required to produce a public good, the lower 
the individual likelihood of signing the agreement. With sufficiently high minimal sizes, 
even in small groups an agent will require near certainty that the others will not 
defect, in order to have incentives to sign. Furthermore, a weighted-sum technology 
of public supply implies that one’s own action is more productive than those of others, 
in so reducing the net gains from cooperation and worsening the likelihood of 
cooperation. Finally, with positive transaction costs, the prognosis for collective action 
is even worse. For most reasonable scenarios, transaction costs enhance the negative 
impact of uncertainty on the formation of an agreement. 
Following this reasoning, it seems that the results of the basic public good model 
extended to take into account the two-stage formation of an agreement, shed a rather 
pessimistic light on the prognosis to foster a collective belief in made in Italy, even in 
club-like arrangements. However, with joint products, the larger the private payoff 
resulting from individual action, the lower is the certainty about the counterparts’ 
behaviour that is required to induce adherence to an agreement. Besides, designing a 
more sophisticated institutional structure may also help overcoming such coordination 
problems. For instance, by introducing stipulated sanctions for defecting in an 
agreement, the associated gains for defection are reduced, so cooperation is fostered.   29
Moreover, by introducing refundability of incurred transaction costs whenever a 
minimal cooperation is not reached, the resulting effect is the elimination of the sunk 





Made in Italy as a virtual brand could be essentially placed in the field of 
stereotypes-that-become-objects-and-actions. Yet, as we maintained, made in Italy 
could not be understood if the foundations of the collective symbolic experience are 
not taken into account. This symbolic experience exists insofar as many people jointly 
recognize it as such. In turn, a set of symbols will be actually shared to the extent 
that a human collective evokes it by means of public rituals. Accordingly, an individual 
will fuel himself with symbols-to-establish-meaning-and-identity, plunging himself in a 
tragedy of Sofocle, in the Christian sacrament of Mass, but also joining an association, 
participating to a classroom, or entering a virtual web space. Within public rituals, the 
collective belief can give rise to both ideas and stereotypes. Ideas are individual paths 
of reasoning that continuously redesign the meaning of symbols, while stereotypes, as 
“pre-established labels”, try to stabilize the meaning of symbols.
16  I n  t h i s  l i n e  o f  
reasoning, we would understand little about the fortunes of made in Italy, if we 
supposed that innovations all come from (new) ideas, since these pave the way to 
contents of the collective belief that are able to revert the fixity of stereotypes. In 
fact, besides macro-innovations that change the boundaries of some representations 
of the collective belief, we can observe a continuum of micro-innovations that, by 
framing stereotypes, coagulate the boundaries of those representations, even outside 
a particular society. The first process feeds back in, and leans on, to the other, since 
the former modifies the meanings that the latter is in charge of asserting and 
spreading. 
In this paper, we have advanced a possible way to model the process of fostering 
the collective belief in made in Italy. We have treated such issue as an economic 
problem of providing a public good that displays different combinations of public and 
                                           
16 According to Montanari [2002, 2], in a world in which, due to the development of metropolises and 
globalization as in contemporary society, contacts increase rapidly, then the knowledge of the others 
ends up as pre-shaped and conventional. The result is that people tend to define the others, not on the 
basis of their peculiar behaviours, but of behavioural expectations, of labels or stereotypes. These 
generalizations are obviously false, but not at all ininfluential or neutral, since generalizations, by 
affecting our knowledge about the reality, also have an effect on our behaviours.   30
private benefits, according to the agent under consideration. In this scenario, since 
investing in stereotypes may give to firms a good deal of private benefits, the 
prognosis for collective action is rather optimistic. Moreover, the different efficiency of 
the various agents in producing public rituals can also be conductive to high levels of 
contributions. Yet, a few complications arise when it comes to distinguish between 
different outputs of such investment. A distortion in the production process may arise, 
which leads firms to devote the most effort to outputs that mainly produce excludable 
benefits, in so disregarding those outputs producing purely-public benefits. In such 
cases, the centralization of the production process is warranted. Weather or not the 
collective belief in made in Italy is pure public good or a joint product, as well as the 
technology of public supply and the strategic model to which individuals’ behaviour 
abide, is a matter of empirical analysis, which is left for future research. Indeed, on 
the basis of the theoretical arguments maintained in this paper, a few suggestions can 
be advanced for public policy and institutional design. 
Redistribution and coordination are the main policy tools available to a central 
authority, in order to stimulate private provision in the joint-product public-good 
model. Yet, it is by no means clear that a group of firms whose endowment is enough 
to cover all costs will automatically make such greater contributions. In fact, private 
incentives should be ascertained on a case-by-case basis. Besides, a formal 
agreement could be used by potential contributors as an institution devoted to govern 
their collective action. This has been modelled as a two-stage game in which the 
decision to sign the agreement is conditioned on the expected outcome of the 
contribution stage. A remarkable result is that redistribution will tend to discourage 
any such agreement. Hence, public decision makers should be aware of the potential 
effects of redistribution, when deciding on how to support the public good provision. 
Such problems are exacerbated when enforcement problems are present, although 
designing a more sophisticated institutional structure may help overcoming in same 
cases those coordination problems. 
However, it should be clear that is not enough to invest in stereotypes in order to 
obtain a solid and pervasive collective belief, almost like it is not enough to spend in 
marketing or R&D in order to prevail over direct competitors. Actually, if the user of 
symbols does not ever consume only stereotypes, but also ideas, a symbol can lie in 
different contexts than those for which it has been placed, in so modifying the 
meaning of actions and making it impossible to forecast the outcome of investments 
in made in Italy as a virtual brand. Nevertheless, even if nobody can orient “from his   31
desk” its future vitality, it holds true that, absent any emblematic event or dedicated 
investments that may foster its evocative power, made in Italy is bound to weaken 
and to remain a “dead symbol”. A collective outcome will reproduce itself only by 
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